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22 September 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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# South Vietnam

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### DAILY BRIEF

\*South Vietnam: The government continues to be plagued by its unresolved tribal problems and by other internal pressures.

In Darlac and Quang Duc Provinces, American and Australian military advisers have persuaded most of the rebellious Rhade strike force elements to return to their bases, but the situation remains precarious. While local Vietnamese authorities appear to be handling the Rhade uprising with restraint, an armed showdown between government forces and the tribesmen is still possible.

[The Rhade strike force officer who is believed to have triggered Sunday's rebellion has disappeared into the bush, and leadership of the uprising now appears to have passed to more moderate tribal leaders. They are demanding a high price for resumption of cooperation with the government, however, including elimination of Vietnamese personnel from US Special Forces training camps in the area.]

Students in the capital of Binh Dinh Province demonstrated on 20 and 21 September denouncing General Tri, recently removed as II Corps commander, and made the now familiar demand that local remnants of former President Diem's Can Lao Party be removed. As was previously the case in other towns, the police made little effort to interfere with the demonstrators and allowed them to use the local radio station to broadcast their demands.

(continued)

The labor walkout in Saigon was called off yesterday evening, but only after union leader Tran Quoc Bui had demonstrated his power to cut off essential services.

Viet Cong activity, possibly in response to the Liberation Front's recent call for heightened efforts to exploit the government's current political disarray, has increased to near record levels during the past several days. Much of this activity has consisted of terrorism and harassment of government posts and New Rural Life hamlets, but several small-scale attacks have produced relatively heavy government casualties.

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United Nations: [No solution is in sight to the USSR's refusal to pay its UN arrears.]

[While six of the eight countries in the working group seized with this issue are still seeking a compromise, India and the UAR apparently prefer to let the matter revert to the General Assembly. An Indian UN Mission officer, who was clearly reluctant to take a firm stand against the USSR, took the line that nothing can be accomplished until after the US elections.]

[In his conversations last week with Indian journalists Khrushchev said the Soviets would not pay for peace-keeping operations not authorized by the Security Council, but maintained the USSR will not withdraw from the UN despite efforts to deprive it of a vote.]

Western Europe: [The outlook for EEC policy on credits to the Soviet bloc remains uncertain.]

[The question was taken up at an EEC Council of Minister's meeting in Brussels last week, but the debate was inconclusive. At a preliminary, lower level meeting, Belgium and the Netherlands seemed to be looking for a way to make exceptions to the five-year rule, and West Germany acknowledged strong industry pressures to do so, according to one of the participants. Italy was noncommittal.]

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[Claiming the credit issue was "political," the French questioned the Council's competence to deal with the matter. The EEC commission views the French attitude with some concern because of its implications for other Community policies.]

[The French are said to be considering the extension of credit to bloc countries on ten-year terms, but apparently intend to date their credit from the time a deal is signed. As a rule, this would effectively lengthen present terms by something like two or three years.]

[The UK recently guaranteed a 15-year credit to cover the Soviet purchase of a polyester fiber plant.]

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NOTES

\*Bolivia: [The followers of those opposition leaders jailed under the government's state-of-siege decree of 20 September have as yet taken no retaliatory action and the country remains relatively quiet.]

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[There are indications that troops will soon move into the mining areas, which have been in a state of anarchy for several months, to re-establish government authority.]

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West Germany: The Foreign Ministry is concerned that German interest in developing and producing missile components may conflict with West Germany's treaty obligations.

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[The Foreign Ministry believes consideration may have to be given to amending the Western European Union treaty, which prohibits West Germany from building guided missiles or component parts especially designed for them.]

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Afghanistan: The Afghan Government under King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Yusuf has received an impressive vote of confidence for its reform program and moderate foreign policy. On 19 September an extraordinary congress of Afghan leaders approved the draft of a more liberal constitution with only minor amendments. Provisions excluding members of the royal family from the cabinet will help allay some fears that the King's cousin, former prime minister Daud, might one day return to power. The congress also endorsed the government's somewhat less militant policy regarding border problems with Pakistan.

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